5. COMMON ERRORS REPEATED IN HISTORY TEXTS AND ARTICLES ON THE POLISH-GERMAN WAR OF 1939
A certain amount of war-time German propaganda has become accepted as fact by both the media and some
historians. These tall tales have been repeated over and over in various texts and articles, despite the fact that
the truth is well known.
Polish Horse Cavalry Charges German Tanks
The most infamous of these tales are reports of the anachronistic Polish Cavalry being slaughtered
after making brave yet foolhardy charges against German tanks. This did not happen.
The Poles were well acquainted with tanks. During the inter-war years the Polish army had begun to
slowly incorporate tanks and tank units into their infantry and cavalry as did most armies of the world at that
time and further, Polish cavalry regiments were equipped with anti-tank guns. At instruction centres, soldiers and their commanders
were trained in the appropriate tactics to defend against enemy armoured units.
However Poland, being a country still recovering from the ravages inflicted upon it by 123 years of foreign
occupation and the recent First World War, had very little money to spend on defense. Poland's entire military budget for
the years 1935 to 1939 was only about ten percent of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) budget for the year 1939 alone! The
Polish army was not able to modernize quickly and thoroughly enough. Furthermore, and in common with other
western countries, its old-fashioned military leaders were not convinced of the advantages of tanks over horse cavalry.
Hollywood and television have swamped us with images of battles fought by tanks and swift
mechanized units. However, cavalry forces were used by most of the combatants during WW2. In fact, the Germans themselves
used over two and a half million horses and mules during the war. The Germans did not disband their cavalry until 1941 but
soon after realized that they could not do without mounted troops and began rebuilding their cavalry units.
Horses were used for parade, transport and support but beyond that mounted troops were needed to patrol
and fight in areas found to be impassable by motorized vehicles. Reconnaissance, dispatch (messengers), or pursuit
could be carried out without regard for petrol supplies. Great successes were achieved by the Soviets using their cavalry
on the open steppes of Russia. (The Cavalry of World War Two, Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Orbis, London,
1979, ISBN 085613 022 2)
During action on the Polish-German front throughout September 1939, Polish cavalry units sought after
and chased German infantry units, engaged in battles, both defensive and offensive, and provided cover for advances and
retreats.
On the 1st of September, following a day of heavy fighting near the Brda River in northern Poland, the
commander of the 18th Lancer (Cavalry) Regiment , Colonel Kazimierz Mastelarz, decided to lead half of his depleted force
in an attempt to swing around the German infantry positions and hit them from the rear. At approximately 19:00, they located
a German infantry battalion in a forest clearing. Having the advantage of surprise, they launched a sabre charge at full
gallop and wiped out the German formation. Unfortunately for them, several armoured cars happened upon the scene and opened
fire on the mounted horsemen with automatic canon fire. About twenty toopers, including the regimental commander, were killed
before the squadrons could withdraw behind a nearby hillock.
On the following day, Italian war correspondents who visited the scene were told that the troopers had been
killed while charging tanks. The media, whether they believed it or not, loved the story and spread it widely.
Polish Troops Attacked Germany First
According to the Germans, Polish soldiers attacked and occupied the radio station in Gleiwitz on or about
August 31, 1939, and broadcast inflammatory statements summoning the Polish minority in eastern Germany to take up arms
against Hitler. This act of "Polish aggression" justified the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.
In fact, the attack was staged by SS troops specifically to provide a pretext for the German invasion. SD
chief Reinhard Heydrich had been put in charge of Operation Himmler in which SS troops dressed in Polish uniforms attacked
the station and broadcast the aforementioned statements. The bodies of several concentration camp inmates, also wearing
Polish uniforms, were left behind to display to foreign correspondents.
The Poles never had any intention of attacking Germany first. They well knew that they did not have the
capability. All Polish planning for war with Germany was based on a defensive retreat, with the aim of holding out until
the Allies (particularly France and Great Britain) attacked Germany from the west, as was agreed upon in the months
leading up to the war.
Polish Air Force Destroyed on the Ground in the First Few Hours of the War
The tiny Polish Air Force flying mostly obsolete planes fought well against tremendous odds.
Most air units were dispersed on August 31, 1939 to new and secret airfields in anticipation of
the German attack. The only destruction inflicted by the Luftwaffe on the morning of September 1 was at the pre-war airfield
at Rakowice near Krakow where 28 unusable aircraft were attacked.
The Luftwaffe ruled the sky only because there were so few Polish planes to give chase. Those that did engage
the enemy fared quite well, for example the units defending Warsaw. The fighter units downed a surprisingly large number
of German planes (105 confirmed kills during the first 6 days against 63 fighters lost). However, these losses coupled with a
lack of fuel, spare parts and serviced airfields, quickly affected the ability of the Polish Air Force to function effectively.
During the second week of the war, most air units were shifted to eastern Poland. Polish bombers continued
to inflict damage on German columns, both infantry and armoured-motorised. Twenty-one more confirmed kills were made by the
time the Soviets invaded on the 17th of September, 1939. Following the Soviet attack, the fighter units were ordered
to evacuate to Romania to be saved for future fighting.
Out of 435 operational aircraft the Poles lost 327 with 98 evacuating to Romania and 10 unaccounted
for.
The Germans meanwhile had 285 aircraft totally destroyed with a further 279 heavily damaged, a total
amounting to about one fifth of the total force committed; quite heavy considering the small force it faced.
Poles Brutally Murder German Civilians
Very early in September 1939, the invading German troops in northwestern Poland found a number of men,
women and children of German descent killed, their corpses laying by a road. The Germans blamed the Poles for this crime and
played it up. The story incited rage among the German troops and is said to have contributed to the German atrocities against
Poles which followed.
Of course, the truth is quite different.
Those slaughtered were fleeing refugees, including a number of German families headed for Germany, but most
were Poles. They had been gunned down by the Luftwaffe.
Poland Did Not Deserve to Exist
The Polish nation has had a difficult time since the late 1700s when it began to shrink, then disappear,
due to the imperialist aspirations of its hostile neighbours. Since most modern, western history has been written as
seen through British and American eyes, few people know that during the golden age of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth in the late Middle Ages and into the Renaissance Poland was:
- For 800 years a sovereign country,
- For 400 years Europe's largest political nation of free citizens (1386 - 1795), a time which saw unprecedented
rights given to Jews and the second democratic Constitution in the world.
- For 300 years a great power of Europe (The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth)
Poland Was Easily Defeated by Germany
This statement is true yet quite meaningless.
Historians and journalists have often written derisively of the lack of Polish preparation, poor leadership,
ineffective command, weak communication structure, weak defences, poor training and antiquated and inadequate
armaments (including a tiny air force and few tanks).
"The German campaign in Poland in 1939 has been regarded by many as little more than a maneuver for
the youthful Wehrmacht. However, the casualty figures and losses in materiel for the period of combat show that the campaign
was more than an exercise with live ammunition... The bulk of the German forces had to be committed to overcome the Poles,
and the expenditure in ammunition, gasoline and materiel was such as to preclude concurrent German operations on a similar
scale in the west or elsewhere." (Kennedy, 1956)
Some sources state that the Polish Army was wiped out within a week; others mention 4 weeks (probably referring
to the capitulation of Warsaw on September 27, 1939).
Poland knew that it had limited capabilities against the known strength of the German Forces. In the years
following Poland's independence (1918), Poland had to repair 125 years worth of damage caused by three different occupiers
and build up an economy from scratch. The armed forces received significant attention only during the late 1930s but there
was not enough time and not enough funding to match the build-up that was possible in Germany.
Most of Polish war planning in the months leading up to the war was simply an attempt to organize
a solid, retreating defensive battle. The units were hoping to slow down the Germans sufficiently so as to buy time before
the western Allies began their offensive against Germany.
Poland was invaded by Germany on September 1, 1939 from three directions; west, north and south. The Poles
fought bravely but were overwhelmed and forced to continually withdraw eastward while waiting for France and England
to attack Germany's western frontier. Following the Soviet invasion from the east on September 17, 1939, the
Polish defenders realized that their defence of Poland was doomed, yet they fought on where possible. By the end
of the second and into the third week of fighting, most of the Polish armies had been severely reduced. Following the
surrender of the garrison at Warsaw (September 27, 1939) remnant units continued to resist. Garrisons on the Baltic seacoast
did not surrender until October 1, 1939. Finally, after 5 weeks of intense fighting, the Poles were finally defeated
when the last remaining pocket of resistance, General Kleeberg's force at Kock, dispersed on October 6, 1939 (Poland
never actually surrendered).
"It would be a mistake to say that this was an easy victory for the Germans. While the Poles lost almost
everything, they did manage to kill 16,000 German soldiers and wound some 32,000 more. Twenty-five percent of the German tanks
were knocked out of action and much equipment was destroyed." (The Polish Campaign 1939,
Zaloga & Madej, Hippocrene Books, New York, N.Y., 1985).
As bad as the Polish defeat appears, compare it to what happened to France and the Soviet Union in
the years that followed.
France was a world power which had the good fortune to learn about the ferocity of the Blitzkrieg
while watching from the sidelines during the German invasion of Poland. Further, with this full knowledge of what it potentially
faced, France had more than 8 months to prepare for war. However, when Germany invaded on May 10, 1940, France (together
with the low countries of Holland and Belgium) was quickly overrun and capitulated on June 22, 1940 only 6 weeks into the
war. It must also be remembered that France was attacked on only one short front, by only one enemy, and the French, Dutch,
Belgian and British forces outnumbered the Germans in men, tanks, and aircraft.
Not much better than Poland given the advance knowledge.
A. J. P. Taylor in his book Europe: Grandeur and Decline (Hamish Hamilton, 1967) comments on the
French defeat: "Gamelin followed the military principles of an earlier age, when man and not machines decided the war. He
was never guilty of victory. Gamelin cannot escape the position of having been in supreme command of the army which suffered
the greatest disaster in history since the Battle of Jena."
Admiral Leahy also commented on the fall of France in his memoirs: "To me 'the magnificent French Army'
was only pretty fast on its feet. It almost got away by running!"
The following quote appears in a compilation of Harold Nicolson's words and is from the editor's introduction
to the chapter on 1939. It describes the scene in September 1939:
"Not a single move was made by Britain and France to relieve pressure on the Poles. Even bombing of industrial
targets in Germany was forbidden for fear of German repraisals on France. On land, 106 French Divisions in the Maginot Line
faced only 23 German Divisions while the Polish campaign lasted, but (French) General Gamelin, the Allied Commander-in-Chief,
said privately that no major offensive could be launched before at least two years." (Vol. II, Letters and Diaries of
Harold Nicolson, The War Years, 1939-45, edited by Nigel Nicolson, Atheneum, N.Y., 1967)
In fact, there were a few minor skirmishes along the Franco-German border and the British did drop two million
propaganda leaflets over Germany.
The Soviet Union meanwhile was Germany's ally against Poland from the start, having invaded Poland
from the east on September 17, 1939. The Red Army then occupied the eastern half of Poland in an agreement with
Hitler. Later, the poor performance of the Soviets against tiny Finland convinced Hitler that the Red Army could easily
be overcome and sealed his decision to invade the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union had also watched the Blitzkrieg from the sidelines (twice!) and was well aware
of what it could do.
Although Stalin expected war with Germany to be inevitable, he did not expect it to come for many years.
However, for a number of months before the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin regularly received reports, from various
sources (he had spies everywhere), of German preparations. In fact, Hitler had begun planning for this invasion
in October of 1940. During June of 1941, Stalin also received reports of German troops and equipment being concentrated
near the border with the Soviet Union. German high altitude reconnaissance planes had begun their flights early in 1941 as
well.
Despite all of the evidence, he failed to accept that he was about to become a victim, dismissing the
intelligence reports as rumours planted by the British. When the blow came on June 22, 1941 the Soviets were caught
completely by surprise and were quickly overrun as had been the Poles and the French before them. And, like
France, the Soviet Union was attacked on only one front, by only one enemy.
Not much better than Poland given the advance knowledge.
In the space of time it took the Red Army and the Germans to crush the final pocket of resistance
in Poland, the Soviets had given up tremendous tracts of territory and suffered enormous casualties. By the end of September,
1941, some 3 months into the campaign, Soviet casualties amounted to 5,000,000 men and 3,000,000 prisoners taken.
On Armament and Leadership
Only twenty years in existence, the Polish army could be excused for being unprepared for the Second World
War for that reason alone.
Compare it to this description of Mussolini's well established North African forces by a German
soldier of the Afrika Korps:
"There was a great camaraderie among the men in the Afrika Korps. I don't think there was ever
an army that had better morale than we did in Africa. The Italian officers wouldn't dream of sleeping in the same ditch as
their enlisted men. In contrast, German officers were always with us...
I felt sorry for the Italian soldiers I saw... their leadership was just terrible. Our supplies may have
been short, but theirs were totally inadequate. Their leadership made no attempts to to provide them with the proper
food or ammunition. The Italians didn't stand up and fight, because they had nothing to defend themselves with. The Italian
tanks weren't second rate but third rate... The Italians were fighting with stuff that was built in 1928, so they couldn't
possibly have won. If the pressure was on them in battle they turned around and walked away. The Italians would rather be
captured than give their lives to a system that could never offer them anything...
Our retreat in Africa was almost constant after the battle of El Alamein. The retreat was very organized
on the German side, but the Italians were very disorganized. Their officers wanted to take everything with them in their trucks,
including their nice double beds, kitchen equipment, beautiful bathroom outfits and all the luxuries they could carry..."
(Hans Klein as told to Robert Mulcahy in World War Two, September 2005, page 28.)
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On the other hand, the Poles taught the Germans a lesson or two, for example:
"Another characteristic of warfare in eastern Europe as learned by the Germans was the considerable guerrilla
activity in rear areas..."
"The successful night attacks of the Poles made a considerable impression on the Germans... With adequate
security, these operations could cause considerable confusion when launched at the boundaries between units, as demonstrated
by the Polish night attack of 12 September at the junction of the 207th Infantry Division and Brigade Eberhard lines before
Gdynia."
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"The German Campaign in Poland, 1939" Kennedy, 1956, U.S. Department of the Army
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A Word About the Bombing of Dresden by Allied Air Forces in February 1945
The bombing of Dresden by the Allies during the last months of World War Two has stirred controversy
from the very beginning.
People questioned and continue to question why such devastation was necessary so close to the end of the
war. In recent times, a number of Allied Air Force pilots have publicly expressed regret at killing large numbers of
German civilians during the Allied bombing of targets in Germany.
Documentaries, articles and books have vilified Allied leaders for undertaking these operations, sometimes
referring to them as "immoral" or "war crimes."
This is ridiculous. While it is comendable to feel compassion for the German civilian, one must look at
this from the point-of-view of the victim.
Historically, the Germans had no concern for the fate of civilians: "... War must leave nothing to the
vanquished but their eyes to weep with..." (Otto. R. Tannenberg, 1911).
Then Hitler told his generals on the eve of the invasion of Poland: "Kill without pity, without mercy all
of Polish language
The feelings of guilt and regret were felt by civilians, soldiers and air crews who did not see nor
understand the extent and true character of the atrocities committed on the ground by the German people and soldiers, against,
most severely, the Polish nation and its people. Fighting their war in the air, Allied air crews were insulated from
the madness of war on the ground. The Commonwealth and American soldiers who liberated Europe never saw what had ocurred in
Poland. British and American civilians knew rationing and experienced the pain of sons killed overseas but mostly they
knew war from the newspapers. Even in the face of the written and graphic photographic evidence that surfaced after the war,
these civilians and soldiers could not then and cannot now relate to the scope of the true tragedy that wasted Poland
over the course of six years.
The Germans who survived the bombings may feel sorry for themselves as they survived an incredible
ordeal, but it was only one incredible ordeal. And they had lived a pretty good life until that time while their sons and
fathers were off raping, looting and killing in foreign lands.
One can certainly empathize with the feelings of guilt and regret which are normal in people who
have a conscience but who could understand how many Germans did not have a conscience, and rabidly hated
Poles, Jews, Ukrainans, Russians, etc. Furthermore, the Germans indulged in their hate follwing the invasion of Poland; murdering,
executing, beating, humiliating, torturing, raping, and mutilating at will. And some, but by no means all, German
civilians treated their Polish slaves with brutality.
Of course, many Germans wanted nothing to do with the Nazis and with the war and were truly ashamed of the
conduct of their countrymen and leaders. The fault lies squarely on the shoulders of Adolf Hitler and his sympathizers.
Anyone reading the material on this web site can see quite clearly that the German invasion of Poland was
incredibly brutal on a day to day basis. The Germans began a campaign of terror against civilians from the moment the war
started. The Luftwaffe bombed both civilian and military targets and strafed not just soldiers but mothers and their children.
Immediately following occupation, Poles, children included, were rounded up and shot or imprisoned. Furthermore, the
Germans bombed Warsaw (and many, many other Polish cities, towns and villages) to ruin in September, 1939 without
the least regard to the suffering inflicted on the civilians. The goal was the destruction of the Polish nation,
plain and simple, and the sooner, the better.
"The defence of Warsaw continued until 28th September. The siege consisted of continuous air raids and
shelling by heavy guns. German leaflets threatened the use of poison gas. Finally, the air bombardment carried out during
the whole of 23rd September destroyed the waterworks and then the enemy started numerous fires with incendiary bombs..."
They again razed the capital, even more thoroughly, during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. During the
occupation, whole families of Jews would be exterminated and any Pole who would aid the Jews would lose their life, often
together with their family.
Neither did Germans care much for the fate of the citizens of Rotterdam:
"During the terrible devastation wrought in Rotterdam by the German Air Force on 14 May (1940), the
number of dead ran into 30,000... further aggravated by the enormous fires which burned for fully two days. As the water supply
had been put out of action no effective means of extinguishing the rapidly spreading flames were available..."
The aggressor reaps what he sows.
Secondly, "bringing the war home to the aggressor" provides an important psychological lift for the victim
of aggression. The British enjoyed sending Hitler into a rage by bombing Berlin and the Americans experienced a
boost in morale when they managed to bomb Tokyo. You can imagine how good the Poles, daily victims of Hitler's hate, felt
when they learned of the payback being exacted of the German civilian population.
The only regret of the Poles, the most broadly and consistently brutalized victims of this war, would have been
that in addition to German military, industrial and civilian losses there would have also been Polish slaves that perished
during the Allied bombing raids.
The Germans took millions of Poles into Germany to slave for the good of the Reich and the benefit
of their German masters. This included: slave labourers for mines, farms and factories, often worked and starved to death,
girls for domestic work, girls for brothels, prisoners of war, concentration camp inmates, men forced into the German army,
young Aryan-looking children adopted into German families under the Germanization program, girls temporarily imported into
Germany for forced sterilization, etc. Starving Poles also went voluntarily to work in Germany, hoping to be fed. Many Ukrainians were
enticed to work for the Germans and POWs of various nationalities were also interned in that country.
The argument that Dresden was not a military target is without foundation. Like many major German centres,
much of its industry was converted to the war effort, with factories scattered throughout the city and its environs (my mother's family were slave labourers in nearby Chemnitz-author). The city was also a transportation
hub and contained a concentration of military activity.
Coincidentally, by early 1945, the Allies had achieved a vastly improved superiority in the air over
both the Luftwaffe and German anti-aircraft defences, which allowed great concentrations of Allied planes to reach their
targets deep in Germany. That was Germany's misfortune as the tide of war had turned against them. The Germans certainly exploited
air superiority over Poland in September 1939 when they unapolegetically bombed Polish villages, towns and cities into
oblivion and strafed children tending their flocks.
Relentless bombing of the enemy, military and civilian, is also expected to break their morale, their
willingness to continue being a party to the war and their will to fight, to destroy infrastructure, food and war materiel,
and ultimately, to force the enemy to accept surrender sooner rather than later. The tactic certainly worked when the Americans
dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yes, many Japanese civilians died and many suffered horribly, but Japan surrendered
almost immediately and this suffering pales in comparison to the suffering that would have occurred if the Americans had had
to invade Japan, resulting in hundreds of thousands if not millions of casualties. In fact, the Japanese were saved from an
even more horrific fate as the Soviet Union, fresh from its victory over Germany, turned its attention eastwards and wanted
to "help" the Americans invade the island of Japan.
No one knew that Hitler would not surrender or seek a peace agreement. No one knew that he would let his
nation suffer until the bitter end. This was Germany's misfortune. This was also the misfortune of all the slaves and Allied
soldiers who continued to die into May of 1945, when the war finally did end.
Finally, any actions against Germany and its people came to a prompt end when Germany surrendered, whereas
the Germans would have continued to commit atrocities until stopped. Yes, we may have sunk down to their level of barbarity but
our "brutality" was an understandable reaction (we are human after all). Furthermore our "brutality" was often required
to "fight fire with fire," but it was also measured and limited.
The Allied countrymen who did not directly experience the brutality of the German and Soviet occupations,
simply could not, and today, cannot, consider the fire-bombing of Dresden to be simply one of many tools available to
use against a relentless aggressor, designed to bring the war to an early conclusion. It was war.
